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SEEKING JUSTICE IN THE EMPIRE STATE: COURT OF
APPEALS BROADENS THE REACH OF LONG ARM
JURISDICTION AND CLARIFIES THE STATUTORY
GUIDELINES FOR APPLICATION OF CPLR SECTION 302(A)(1)
Jay C. Carlisle*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article will discuss developments in long-arm jurisdiction
under CPLR section 302(a)(1)1 and analyze the recent New York
State Court of Appeals‘s thoughtful and instructive decision in Licci
ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL.2 Licci decided the
question of whether a non-domiciliary‘s maintenance of a bank
account in New York constituted a ―transaction of business‖ out of
which the plaintiff‘s claims arose under the state‘s long-arm statute.
The Licci plaintiffs had alleged that the defendant funded a
terrorist organization responsible for the injuries and deaths of
certain plaintiffs and decedents they represented.3 The Licci
opinion did not decide if New York had jurisdiction over the

* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law: A.B., University of California at Los
Angeles; J.D., University of California at Davis. Jay C. Carlisle II is one of the founding
professors at Pace University School of Law and has been an adjunct professor at the New
York, Fordham, and Quinnipiac Law Schools. He is a Commissioner for the New York State
Law Revision Commission, an elected Life Fellow of the American Bar Foundation, and a
Referee for the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct. Professor Carlisle has
received the ALI-ABA Harrison Tweed Special Merit Award for his contributions to
Continuing Legal Education and the Academic Excellence Award from the New York State
Trial Lawyers Association. He wishes to thank Brian Zucco, a 3L at Albany Law School, for
all of his assistance.
1 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(1) (McKinney 2013). Section 302 of the CPLR is New York‘s longarm statute. 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN, HAROLD L. KORN & ARTHUR R. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL
PRACTICE: CPLR ¶ 302.00 (David L. Ferstendig ed., 2d ed. 2013). It allows New York State
courts to assert jurisdiction over non-domiciliary persons and foreign corporations incapable
of being served within New York, but who have the necessary contacts with the state that are
listed in section 302. Such defendants may be served in New York pursuant to CPLR 313.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 313 (McKinney 2013).
2 Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 984 N.E.2d 893, 960
N.Y.S.2d 695 (2012).
3 Id. at 333, 984 N.E.2d at 896, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
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defendant but analyzed a certified question4 from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit regarding whether there
was a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendant.5
In Licci, the Empire State‘s highest court answered the Second
Circuit‘s question in the affirmative, expansively defining the
―transaction of business‖ clause under CPLR section 302(a)(1)6 and
extending the jurisdictional reach of the long-arm statute‘s ―arising
out of‖ provision.7 The Licci opinion is a broad and pragmatic
statutory interpretation of CPLR section 302(a)(1) by the Court of
Appeals. It signals the court‘s willingness to apply the state‘s longarm statute as its drafters intended,8 clarifies prior jurisprudential
entanglement of statutory and constitutional issues,9 and is
welcome news for the plaintiff‘s bar.10
A. Jurisdiction in New York
A New York State court does not have jurisdiction to render a
valid, binding judgment unless it has ―subject matter jurisdiction
(competence to entertain a claim or claims), in personam
jurisdiction (power over the person or property), and proper
notice.‖11 Consideration of subject matter jurisdiction and notice
are not included in this article. If the defendant consents, is

4 Interjurisdictional certification is the process that enables a federal court, prior to ruling
on a matter, to ―obtain a definitive answer from a state‘s highest court on an unsettled
question of state law.‖ Sol Wachtler, Lecture, Federalism is Alive and Well and Living in
New York, 75 ALB. L. REV. 659, 661–62 (2012). The certification mechanism thereby
eliminates a federal court‘s need to speculate as to how a state court would rule in such
situations. See generally Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman, Interactive Judicial
Federalism: Certified Questions in New York, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 373 (2000) (providing an
in-depth treatment of the topic in New York).
5 O‘Neill v. Asat Trust Reg. (In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001), 714 F.3d 659,
681 n.16 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d
50, 66, 74 (2d Cir. 2012) (certifying questions to the New York Court of Appeals), certified
questions accepted, 18 N.Y.3d 952, 967 N.E.2d 697, 944 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2012), certified
questions answered, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 984 N.E.2d 893, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695 (2012), and vacated
and remanded, No. 10-1306-cv, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 21189 (Oct. 18, 2013).
6 See infra Part III.A.
7 See infra Part III.B.
8 See Adolph Homburger, The Reach of New York’s Long-Arm Statute: Today and
Tomorrow, 15 BUFF. L. REV. 61, 62 (1966); see also infra Part IV.B.ii (discussing the Court of
Appeals‘s application of the long-arm statute in Licci).
9 See infra Part IV.
10 See David D. Siegel, Longarm Jurisdiction: Foreign Bank’s Use of Correspondent N.Y.
Bank for Money Transfers that Aid Foreign Terrorist Acts Can Support N.Y. Jurisdiction,
N.Y. ST. L. DIG., Dec. 2012.
11 Jay C. Carlisle, Recent Jurisdiction Developments in the New York Court of Appeals, 29
PACE L. REV. 417, 418 (2009).
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domiciled, incorporated, licensed to do business, or is doing business
in New York, a state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
that defendant.12 Jurisdiction over the property includes in rem and
quasi-in rem jurisdiction.13
These traditional grounds for in
personam or power jurisdiction are referred to as general
jurisdiction and were developed prior to the adoption of the CPLR. 14
They were incorporated into CPLR 301 by the New York
legislature.15
Specific jurisdiction is authorized by CPLR 302.16 It is a ―single
contact‖ long-arm statute, which permits the state‘s courts to
restrictively assert in personam jurisdiction over non-domiciliary
individuals, corporations and other entities designated by the
statute that are not subject to general jurisdiction.17 Jurisdiction
under CPLR 302 is restricted by the contacts enumerated in the
statute and the claims they are based on must arise out of those
contacts.18 The long-arm statute does not extend as far as is
constitutionally permissible19 and its application cannot violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.20
In personam jurisdiction must be analyzed separately for each
cause of action in the plaintiff‘s complaint and for each defendant,
co-defendant, and third party defendant.21 New York courts
12 See DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE §§ 80–82, 95, at 142–47, 176–78 (5th ed.
2011).
13 See id. § 101, at 185–87. In rem jurisdiction occurs when the litigation directly involves
property within the state such as mortgage foreclosures, liens or questions of ownership or
status of the property. Id. § 101, at 186. Quasi-in-rem jurisdiction occurs when a nondomiciliary‘s property within New York is properly and timely attached to obtain a basis, up
to the value of the property, in a cause of action having a substantial and meaningful
relationship with the property. See id. § 104, at 190–94.
14 Jay C. Carlisle, New York Civil Practice, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 343, 361–62 (1991).
15 Id.
16 N.Y. C.P.L.R 302 (McKinney 2013).
17 Jay C. Carlisle, Civil Practice, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 75, 98–106 (1988).
18 Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 339–40, 984 N.E.2d
893, 900–01, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695, 702–03 (2012); see also Johnson v. Ward, 4 N.Y.3d 516, 520,
829 N.E.2d 1201, 1203, 797 N.Y.S.2d 33, 35 (2005) (holding there was an insufficient nexus
between the alleged transactions of business conducted in New York State and the plaintiff‘s
personal injury claim from a motor vehicle accident); McGowan v. Smith, 52 N.Y.2d 268, 271,
419 N.E.2d 321, 322, 437 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (1981) (observing that courts may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary under CPLR section 302(1)(a) where the cause of
action arises from the non-domiciliary‘s transaction of business within the state).
19 Banco Ambrosiano, S.p.A. v. Artoc Bank & Trust, Ltd., 62 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 464 N.E.2d
432, 435, 476 N.Y.S.2d 64, 67 (1984) (―[I]n setting forth certain categories of bases for longarm jurisdiction, [the New York long-arm statute] does not go as far as is constitutionally
permissible.‖).
20 See Carlisle, supra note 17, at 101–02.
21 Jay C. Carlisle, Second Circuit 2000-2001 Personal Jurisdiction Developments, 21
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determine if in personam jurisdiction exists by using a three-step
process. First, assuming the court has competence to hear a matter,
the court determines whether the plaintiff‘s service of process upon
the defendant was procedurally proper.22
Second, the court
determines whether there is a statutory basis under CPLR 301 or
302 that renders the service of process effective.23 Third, the court
determines whether the exercise of in personam jurisdiction
comports with constitutional principles.24 The New York long-arm
statute does not extend to the constitutional limits established by
International Shoe Co. v. Washington25 and its progeny. Thus,
sometimes a court‘s statutory analysis under CPLR 302 may
resemble the due process analysis under the Fourteenth
Amendment leading to an entanglement in New York decisional
jurisprudence.26 This entanglement appears particularly evident
with respect to CPLR section 302(a)(1)27 and can result in a faulty
jurisdictional analysis.28
Federal courts sitting in diversity actions hearing claims that do
not involve nationwide service of process must, under Erie
principals, first apply New York State substantive law to determine
if there is a statutory basis for in personam jurisdiction under CPLR

QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 15, 17 (2001).
22 See CIVIL PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS IN NEW YORK § 9:2 (Philip M. Halpern et al. eds.,
2000).
23 Id. § 9:3–9:4.
24 Id. § 9:1.
25 Int‘l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The U.S. Supreme Court held that
states‘ power to exercise in personam jurisdiction over non-domiciliary defendants was
subject to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Thus, an out-of-state defendant must have ―certain minimum contacts with
[the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‗traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.‘‖ Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
26 See Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 246–47 (2d Cir. 2007) (―New York
decisions thus, at least in their rhetoric, tend to conflate the long-arm statutory and
constitutional analyses by focusing on the constitutional standard: whether the defendant‘s
conduct constitutes ‗purposeful[] avail[ment]‘ ‗of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.‘‖ (alterations in
original) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958))); McKee Elec. Co. v. RaulandBorg Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 377, 382, 229 N.E.2d 604, 607, 283 N.Y.S.2d 34, 37–38 (1967).
27 See Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 66, 74 (2d Cir.
2012), certified questions accepted, 18 N.Y.3d 952, 967 N.E.2d 697, 944 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2012),
certified questions answered, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 984 N.E.2d 893, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695 (2012), and
vacated and remanded, No. 10-1306-cv, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 21189 (Oct. 18, 2013); see also
Chloé v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 169 (2d Cir. 2010) (taking note of the
entanglement issue); Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 9 N.Y.3d 501, 508, 881 N.E.2d 830, 834–35,
851 N.Y.S.2d 381, 385–86 (2007) (using a due process analysis as guidance in analyzing New
York‘s long arm statute).
28 See infra Part IV.B.i.
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302.29 Only if statutory jurisdiction exists, must the court then
decide if an assertion of jurisdiction is permitted under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.30
B. The Licci Opinions
The Licci case was originally filed in New York State Supreme
Court and removed to the United States District Court of the
Southern District of New York.31 The district court dismissed
plaintiff‘s claims, in part, on the grounds there was not a statutory
basis for them under CPLR section 302(a)(1).32 The court held that
defendant Lebanese Canadian Bank (―LCB‖) did not ―transact[]
business‖ in New York State33 and that the plaintiff‘s claims did not
arise out of the act enumerated in the long-arm statute because
there was not an ―articulable nexus‖ or ―substantial relationship‖
between the claims and the alleged ―transaction of business‖ in New
York.34 The district court stated ―[t]he injuries and death suffered
by plaintiffs and their family members were caused by the rockets
launched by Hizbollah, not by the banking services provided by LCB
through its correspondent account or wire transfers with Amex
Bank via New York.‖35 Finally, the district court ignored the circuit
court‘s ―constitutional avoidance‖ doctrine and conducted a due

29 See Fort Knox Music, Inc. v. Baptiste, 203 F.3d 193, 196 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that
federal courts must apply the personal jurisdiction rules of the forum state); Bensusan Rest.
Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997) (dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction
where plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant committed a tortious act in New York, as
required under the New York long-arm statute); Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763
F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (―[P]ersonal jurisdiction . . . is determined by reference to the law of
the jurisdiction in which the court sits.‖); Arrowsmith v. United Press Int‘l, 320 F.2d 219, 223
(2d Cir. 1963) (holding that in diversity actions jurisdiction is governed by the law of the state
in which the court sits).
30 E.g., A. I. Trade Fin., Inc. v. Petra Bank, 989 F.2d 76, 82–83 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that
the court‘s exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant in a breach of contract action for
defendant‘s failure to perform financial services in New York did not offend due process).
31 See Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 330–31, 984
N.E.2d 893, 894, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695, 696 (2012).
32 Id. at 332, 984 N.E.2d at 895, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
33 Id.
34 Licci ex rel. Licci v. Am. Express Bank Ltd., 704 F. Supp. 2d 403, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
aff’d in part sub nom. Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 672 F.3d 155 (2d
Cir. 2012), questions certified to New York Court of Appeals, 673 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2012),
certified questions accepted, 18 N.Y.3d 952, 967 N.E.2d 697, 944 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2012), certified
questions answered, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 984 N.E.2d 893, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695 (2012), and vacated
and remanded, No. 10-1306-cv, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 21189 (Oct. 18, 2013).
35 Id.

89 CARLISLE (DO NOT DELETE)

94

1/21/2014 8:20 PM

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 77.1

process inquiry finding there was no jurisdiction over LCB.36
Plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit which addressed solely
the question of whether there was a statutory basis under CPLR
section 302(a)(1) for in personam jurisdiction.37 The circuit court,
after a thoughtful and instructive statutory analysis, concluded that
Court of Appeals law did not appear to have addressed the
jurisdictional questions presented in Licci and that the decisions of
other New York courts did not assist the circuit court in predicting
with confidence how the Court of Appeals would decide them.38 The
circuit court concluded that important public policy choices, best left
to New York‘s highest court, were involved and certified them to the
Court of Appeals.39
Part II of this article will summarize the Licci holdings of the
district and circuit court. Part III will analyze the Court of Appeals
decision in Licci. Part IV will explain the Court of Appeals‘s helpful
clarification of the jurisprudential entanglement issue under CPLR
section 302(a)(1) and Part V predicts how Licci will impact future
statutory jurisdictional inquiries in New York State and federal
courts.
II. SUMMARY OF THE LICCI FEDERAL OPINIONS
A. Licci: The United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York
The district court‘s opinion was issued on March 31, 2010 in the
form of a Memorandum Decision and Order by Judge George B.
Daniels.40 The district court granted defendant American Express
Bank Ltd.‘s (―Amex Bank‖) motion to dismiss plaintiff‘s complaint
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and defendant LCB‘s
motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6) and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(2).41

36 Id. Under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, if the plaintiffs premise their theory
of in personam jurisdiction upon CPLR 302, and if the district court found the requirements
of the long-arm statute were not satisfied, there was no need to address the question of
whether jurisdiction would comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 406; see also United States v. Magassouba, 544 F.3d 387, 404 (2d Cir.
2008) (collecting the cases discussing the constitutional avoidance doctrine).
37 Licci, 673 F.3d at 54.
38 See id. at 61–66.
39 Id. at 74–75.
40 Licci, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 404.
41 Id.
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1. In Personam Jurisdiction Over LCB
Judge Daniels explained that since no evidentiary hearing or
discovery had been held plaintiffs need only make a prima facie
showing that in personam jurisdiction over LCB exists.42 He noted,
―The Court is to accept all averments of jurisdictional facts as true,
and construe the pleadings and affidavits in plaintiffs‘ favor,‖ and
that he ―must . . . determine whether New York state law provides a
basis to assert personal jurisdiction over LCB, and if so, must then
determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction would comport with
constitutional principles of due process.‖43 Plaintiffs argued that
LCB was subject to in personam jurisdiction under New York‘s longarm statute, CPLR section 302(a)(1), which required a showing that
LCB transacted business in New York and that the plaintiffs‘ claims
arose from the business activity.44 Judge Daniels stated, ―The mere
maintenance of correspondent bank account with a financial
institution in New York is not, standing alone, a sufficient basis to
subject a foreign defendant to personal jurisdiction under [section]
302(a)(1).‖45 He admitted that on rare occasions active use of a
correspondent account may confer in personam jurisdiction over a
non-domiciliary defendant but only if the use ―constitute[d] the ‗very
root‘ of the claims against the foreign bank.‖46 Furthermore Judge
Daniels believed the use ―of wire transfers [was] not a ‗use‘ of a
correspondent account which alone [was] sufficient to confer
jurisdiction over a foreign bank.‖47
Judge Daniels also believed that ―[n]o articulable nexus or
substantial relationship existed between LCB‘s general use of its
correspondent account for wire transfers through New York and the
specific terrorist activities by Hizbollah underlying plaintiffs‘
claims.‖48 He focused on the injuries and deaths suffered by

42 Id. at 406 (citing Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir.
1990); Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1985)).
43 Licci, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 406 (citing Tex. Int‘l Magnetics, Inc. v. Auriga-Aurex, Inc. (In re
Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litig.), 334 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 2003), PDK Labs, Inc. v.
Friedlander, 103 F.3d 1105, 1108 (2d Cir. 1997), and Saudi v. Marine Atlantic Ltd., 306 F.
App‘x 653, 654 (2d Cir. 2009)).
44 Licci, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 406.
45 Id. at 407 (citing Tamam v. Fransabank SAL, 677 F. Supp. 2d 720, 726–27 (S.D.N.Y.
2010); Daventree Ltd. v. Republic of Azerbaijan, 349 F. Supp. 2d 736, 762 (S.D.N.Y. 2004);
Leema Enters., Inc. v. Willi, 575 F. Supp. 1533, 1537 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
46 Licci, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 407 (quoting Correspondent Servs. Corp. v. J.V.W. Invs. Ltd.,
120 F. Supp. 2d 401, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
47 Licci, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 407.
48 Id. at 408 (citing Tamam, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 726).
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plaintiffs and their family members as being caused by Hezbollah‘s
rockets and not by LCB‘s banking services provided via its
correspondent account with Amex Bank in New York.49 Judge
Daniels reasoned, ―LCB‘s maintenance or use of its correspondent
bank account is too attenuated from Hizbollah‘s attacks in Israel to
assert personal jurisdiction based solely on wire transfers through
New York.‖50 Judge Daniels, having found no statutory basis for in
personam jurisdiction under CPLR section 302(a)(1), ignored the
circuit court‘s constitutional avoidance doctrine and, after a due
process inquiry, concluded an assertion of personal jurisdiction over
LCB would not comport with constitutional principles under the
Fourteenth Amendment.51 The court did not reach the merits of
LCB‘s alternative arguments to dismiss under section 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.52 Judge Daniels also denied
plaintiffs‘ alternative request to conduct limited jurisdictional
discovery pertaining to LCB‘s correspondent banking analysis with
Amex Bank.53 The plaintiffs did not challenge this finding in their
appeal to the Second Circuit.54
B. Licci: The United States District Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit
1. Introduction
The circuit court‘s opinion was rendered by Judges Amalya
Kearse, Robert Sack and Robert Katzmann.55
The court
summarized the district court‘s holding with respect to the
statutory construction of CPLR section 302(a)(1) and stated,
The question of whether, and if so to what extent, personal
jurisdiction may be established under N.Y. CPLR [section]
302(a)(1) over foreign banks based on their use of
correspondent banking accounts in New York remains

Licci, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 408.
Id. at 408.
51 Id.
52 See id. at 408, 411.
53 Id. at 408.
54 Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 58 n.7 (2d Cir. 2012),
certified questions accepted, 18 N.Y.3d 952, 967 N.E.2d 697, 944 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2012), certified
questions answered, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 984 N.E.2d 893, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695 (2012), and vacated
and remanded, No. 10-1306-cv, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 21189 (Oct. 18, 2013).
55 Id. at 54. See generally Second Circuit Judges, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR SECOND CIRCUIT,
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/judgesmain.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2013) (providing
biographies of the circuit court judges).
49
50
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unsettled. We conclude that New York law is insufficiently
developed in this area to enable us to predict with confidence
how the New York Court of Appeals would resolve these
issues of New York State law presented on appeal. We
therefore certify to the Court of Appeals two questions
concerning the application of the New York long-arm
statute.56
These questions were whether LCB had transacted business in
New York under CPLR section 302(a)(1) and, if so, whether
plaintiffs‘ claims arose out of the defendant‘s business transaction.57
2. Background
The circuit court devoted considerably more time to the
procedural history, background, and allegations in the plaintiffs‘
complaint than did the district court.58 The circuit court stressed
that the plaintiffs alleged ―LCB had actual knowledge that
Hizbollah was a violent terrorist organization, as reflected on
official government lists, and that Shahid was part of Hizbollah‘s
financial arm.‖59 The circuit court noted that ―plaintiffs allege that
the bank, as a matter of official LCB policy, continuously supports
and supported Hizbollah and its anti-Israel program, goals and
activities,‖ and emphasized plaintiffs‘ allegation ―that LCB carried
out the wire transfers in order to assist and advance Hizbollah‘s
goal of using terrorism to destroy the State of Israel.‖60
The circuit court explained the procedural history of the Licci
case, referencing each of the plaintiffs‘ five claims against LCB, and
noted plaintiffs‘ submission of ―a declaration by a former Israeli
counter-terrorism official attesting to the fact that Shahid is a
financial front for Hizballah.‖61 The court examined the district
court‘s jurisdictional ruling at length, observing that the district
Licci, 674 F.3d at 55.
Id. at 74–75.
58 Compare id. at 55 n.2, 56 n.4, 56–57, 57 n.5 (discussing in-depth the procedural history,
background and allegations in plaintiffs‘ complaint), with Licci ex rel. Licci v. Am. Express
Bank Ltd., 704 F. Supp. 2d 403, 404–06 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (focusing primarily on the allegations
contained in plaintiffs‘ complaint), aff’d in part sub nom. Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese
Canadian Bank, SAL, 672 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2012), questions certified to New York Court of
Appeals, 673 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2012), certified questions accepted, 18 N.Y.3d 952, 967 N.E.2d
697, 944 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2012), certified questions answered, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 984 N.E.2d 893,
960 N.Y.S.2d 695 (2012), and vacated and remanded, No. 10-1306-cv, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS
21189 (Oct. 18, 2013).
59 Licci, 673 F.3d at 56 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60 Id. at 56–57 (internal quotation marks omitted).
61 Id. at 57.
56
57
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court had concluded that the LCB-Amex Bank wire transfer use of
the correspondent bank account in New York was not a use
sufficient to constitute a ―transaction of business‖ and that the
correspondent bank account was too attenuated from Hezbollah‘s
attacks in Israel to fulfill the ―arising out of‖ requirement under
CPLR section 302(a)(1).62
3. Discussion
The circuit court explained that since the assertion of in
personam jurisdiction rests on CPLR 302, a statutory inquiry was
first necessary; if jurisdiction was permissible under the long-arm
statute, a second constitutional inquiry was necessary.63 It would
involve the relevant constitutional restraints imposed by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.64 The court panel
noted that since New York‘s long-arm statute is restricted and does
not extend in all respects to the constitutional limits provided by
International Shoe and its progeny: ―The state statutory and federal
constitutional standards are thus not co-extensive, as they are in
many other states.‖65 The court, speaking through Judge Sack
opined, ―In many cases, the jurisdictional analysis [statutory
determination of basis] under the New York long-arm statute may
closely resemble the analysis under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.‖66
He observed that sometimes the
statutory analysis of whether CPLR 302 provides a basis for in
personam jurisdiction and the analysis of federal constitutional
limitations have become entangled in the jurisprudence of New
York case law.67 Judge Sack stated, ―This similarity of state-law
and constitutional standards appears particularly evident with
respect to N.Y. CPLR [section] 302(a)(1), the subdivision of the New
York long-arm statute under which the plaintiffs in this case argue
the court has personal jurisdiction over LCB.‖68

Id. at 57–58.
Id. at 59–60.
64 Id. at 60.
65 Id. at 60–61.
66 Id. at 61 n.11 (citing Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 2007)).
67 Id.
68 Id. (citing Chloé v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 166, 169 (2d Cir.
2010); Best Van Lines, Inc., 490 F.3d at 247; Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 9 N.Y.3d 501, 508,
881 N.E.2d 830, 834–35, 851 N.Y.S.2d 381, 385–86 (2007)).
62
63
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a. “Transaction of Business” Requirement
The circuit court first addressed the question of whether LCB‘s
conduct constituted a ―transaction of business‖ under CPLR section
302(a)(1).69 The court, relying on the Court of Appeals decision in
Fischbarg v. Doucet70 focused on whether LCB had committed some
act by which it purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities in New York.71 The court stressed that the
―defendant need not physically enter New York State in order to
transact business‖ but that the quality and nature of the
defendant‘s contacts in New York are crucial.72 The court stated
that ―[t]he mere maintenance of [a] correspondent bank account‖
and its use in New York are distinct factors.73
The circuit court identified four Court of Appeals cases that
involved similar sets of circumstances74 and analyzed each. The
principle case was Amigo Foods Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank-New
York,75 which had announced a general rule that a correspondent
bank relationship alone is not sufficient to form the basis for longarm jurisdiction under CPLR section 302(a)(1).76 Judge Sack
distinguished Amigo from Licci because LCB had repeatedly used
its New York bank account with the knowledge it was funding
Hezbollah.77 The remaining cases, with Amigo, demonstrated to the
circuit panel ―that the ‗transaction of business‘ prong of the test for
jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1) may, in appropriate cases, be
satisfied by a showing that the defendant maintained and used a
correspondent bank account in New York.‖78 This is true, according
to Judge Sack, ―even if no other contacts between the defendant and
New York can be established, if the defendant‘s use of that account
was purposeful.‖79

Licci, 673 F.3d at 61.
Fischbarg v. Doucet, 9 N.Y.3d 375, 880 N.E.2d 22, 849 N.Y.S.2d 501 (2007); see also
Carlisle, supra note 11, at 420–25 (discussing the Fischbarg case).
71 Licci, 673 F.3d at 61–62.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 62.
74 See id. at 63–64.
75 Amigo Foods Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank-N.Y., 39 N.Y.2d 391, 348 N.E.2d 581, 384
N.Y.S.2d 124 (1976).
76 Id. at 396, 348 N.E.2d at 584, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 127.
77 See Licci, 673 F.3d at 65–66.
78 Id. at 64.
79 Id. at 66 (alteration in original).
69
70
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b. “Arising Out of” Requirement:
i. ―Articulable Nexus‖ and Substantial Relationship
The circuit court explained, ―There is no bright-line test for
determining whether the [articulable] ‗nexus‘ [or substantial
relationship tests are] present in a particular case.‖80 The court
stated, ―This inquiry is a fact-specific one, and [the point at which]
the connection between the parties‘ activities in New York and the
[plaintiffs‘] claim crosses the line from ‗substantially related‘ to
‗mere coincidence‘ is not always self-evident.‖81 The circuit court
criticized the district court‘s conclusion that there was no
articulable nexus or substantial relationship between LCB‘s general
use of its correspondent account and the specific terrorist activities
underlying plaintiff‘s claim.82 The circuit court noted the district
court did not separately evaluate the plaintiffs‘ Anti-Terrorism Act,
Alien Tort Statute (―ATS‖), and Israeli-law claims.83 The circuit
court reasoned these factors and questions of whether the ―arising
out of‖ requirement under CPLR 302 should be applied narrowly or
permissively, combined with the issue of whether a causal
connection between the defendant‘s contacts with New York and the
plaintiff‘s lawsuit is required, caused an ambiguity in the meaning
of the statute which would best be answered by certifying the
questions to New York‘s highest court.84 The two questions were:
Certified Question No. 1
Does a foreign bank‘s maintenance of a correspondent bank
account at a financial institution in New York, and use of
that account to effect ―dozens‖ of wire transfers on behalf of a
foreign client, constitute a ―transact[ion]‖ of business in New
York within the meaning of N.Y. CPLR [section] 302(a)(1)?85
Certified Question No. 2
If so, do the plaintiffs‘ claims under the Anti-Terrorism Act,
the ATS, or for negligence or breach of statutory duty in
violation of Israeli law, ‗aris[e] from‘ LCB‘s transaction of
business in New York within the meaning of N.Y. CPLR
Id. at 67.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sole Resort, S.A. De C.V. v. Allure Resorts Mgmt.,
LLC, 450 F.3d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 2006)).
82 Licci, 673 F.3d at 67–68.
83 See id. at 68–75 (discussing the Anti-Terrorism Act, ATS, and Israeli-law claims with
reference to New York‘s long-arm statute).
84 Id. at 69–70, 74.
85 Id. at 74 (first alteration in original).
80
81
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[section] 302(a)(1)?86
III. LICCI: THE NEW YORK STATE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
On November 20, 2012, the Court of Appeals unanimously
answered both certified questions in the affirmative.87
A. “Transaction of Business” Requirement
The court, speaking through Judge Read, clarified the facts88 and
noted that the several dozen United States, Canadian, and Israeli
plaintiffs asserted personal jurisdiction over LCB was proper under
CPLR section 302(a)(1).89 The court found that ―LCB did not
operate branches or offices, or maintain employees, in the United
States. Its sole point of contact with the United States was a
correspondent banking account with AmEx [Bank] in New York.‖90
In determining whether LCB had transacted business under New
York‘s long-arm statute, Judge Read reviewed four of the court‘s
prior decisions.91 First, and most closely analogous to Licci, was
Amigo Foods Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank-New York.92 In Amigo,
one non-domiciliary defendant (Aroostock Trust Company) moved to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.93
Plaintiff had alleged that
Aroostock and a New York bank, Irving Bank, were agents with a
corresponding bank relationship upon which long-arm jurisdiction
was based.94 Alternatively, plaintiff asked for depositions on the
question of jurisdiction.95 The supreme court ordered depositions
but a divided appellate division reversed and granted the
jurisdictional motion to dismiss, concluding that the Irving Bank
was not Aroostock‘s New York agent and that Aroostock had not
transacted business in the Empire State.96 The Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that disclosure should proceed because Amigo had
alleged an agency relationship between the two banks.97 ―After
Id. at 75 (first alteration in original).
Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 341, 984 N.E.2d 893, 901,
960 N.Y.S.2d 695, 703 (2012).
88 See id. at 330–33, 984 N.E.2d at 894–96, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 696–98.
89 Id. at 331, 984 N.E.2d at 895, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
90 Id. at 332, 984 N.E.2d at 895, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
91 See id. at 334–38, 984 N.E.2d at 897–900, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 699–702.
92 See id. at 335, 984 N.E.2d at 896, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
93 Id. at 335, 984 N.E.2d at 898, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
94 Id. at 335–36, 984 N.E.2d at 898, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 336, 984 N.E.2d at 898, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
97 Id.
86
87
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discovery was completed, Aroostock again unsuccessfully moved to
dismiss. The appellate division unanimously reversed.‖98 The
Court of Appeals affirmed for the reasons specified by the Appellate
Division99: ―In our view, disclosure has revealed nothing which
forms the basis for long-arm jurisdiction over Aroostock in the
present case.‖100
The Licci court explained that after Amigo some New York State
courts had found ―that a correspondent banking relationship
‗standing by itself‘ is insufficient to establish long-arm jurisdiction‖
under the statutory requirements of CPLR 302.101 The court
pointed out that these state decisions had been relied on by federal
district court judges in the Second Circuit for the proposition that
―the ‗mere maintenance‘ of a correspondent bank account in New
York does not suffice to establish personal jurisdiction there.‖102
The Licci court explained that under New York law Amigo stands
for the proposition that the mere maintenance of a correspondent
bank account may, depending on the particular facts of a case, be
sufficient to constitute a transaction of business provided that ―the
defendant‘s use of that account was purposeful.‖103
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Amigo facts, unlike those
in Licci, ―revealed . . . [that] Aroostock‘s purported use of the
account . . . was essentially adventitious—i.e., it was not even
Aroostock‘s doing.‖104
The court distinguished Amigo on the
grounds of the complex nature of the interbank activity in Licci
whose sole purpose was to facilitate the flow of money throughout
the world.105 The court stated:
Nonetheless, complaints alleging a foreign bank‘s repeated
use of a correspondent account in New York on behalf of a
client—in effect, a ―course of dealing‖—show purposeful

Id.
Amigo Foods Corp v. Marine Midland Bank-N.Y., 46 N.Y.2d 855, 857, 387 N.E.2d 226,
226, 414 N.Y.S.2d 515, 515 (1979).
100 Licci, 20 N.Y.3d at 337, 984 N.E.2d at 899, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 701 (quoting Amigo Foods
Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank-N.Y., 61 A.D.2d 896, 897, 402 N.Y.S.2d 406, 408 (App. Div. 1st
Dep‘t 1978)).
101 Licci, 20 N.Y.3d at 337, 984 N.E.2d at 899, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
102 Id. (quoting Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 65 (2d Cir.
2012), certified questions accepted, 18 N.Y.3d 952, 967 N.E.2d 697, 944 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2012),
certified questions answered, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 984 N.E.2d 893, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695 (2012), and
vacated and remanded, No. 10-1306-cv, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 21189 (Oct. 18, 2013)).
103 Licci, 20 N.Y.3d at 338, 984 N.E.2d at 899, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 701 (quoting Licci, 673 F.3d
at 66).
104 Licci, 20 N.Y.3d at 338, 984 N.E.2d at 900, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 702.
105 Id. at 338–39, 984 N.E.2d at 900, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 702.
98
99
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availment of New York‘s dependable and transparent
banking system, the dollar as a stable and fungible currency,
and the predictable jurisdictional and commercial law of
New York and the United States.106
Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that LCB‘s contacts with
New York had satisfied the statutory requirements of CPLR section
302(a)(1).107 In so doing the court reminded the bench and bar that
―purposeful availment‖ inquiries are objective and require a
detailed examination of the particular facts in each case with a
focus on the quality and nature of the defendants‘ contact or
contacts with the Empire State.108 The court‘s holding represents a
more precise definition of what constitutes a ―transaction of
business‖ under CPLR section 302(a)(1) and provides proper
precedent for future jurisdictional inquires by the bench and bar of
New York.109
B. “Arising Out of” Requirement
The Court of Appeals reaffirmed its interpretation of the second
prong of CPLR section 302(a)(1)‘s statutory jurisdictional inquiry as
mandating an ―articulable nexus‖ or ―substantial relationship‖
between the business transaction and the claim asserted.110 The
court then stated, ―[w]e have consistently held that causation is not
required, and that the inquiry under the statute is relatively
permissive.‖111 The court explained that the ―arising from‖ prong of
Id. at 339, 984 N.E.2d at 900, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 702 (citations omitted).
Id. at 340–41, 984 N.E.2d at 901, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
108 Id. at 338, 984 N.E.2d at 899–900, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 701–02.
109 See DAVID D. SIEGEL & PATRICK M. CONNORS, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 86, at 20–21 (5th
ed. Supp. July 2013).
110 Licci, 20 N.Y.3d at 339, 984 N.E.2d at 900, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 702 (quoting Kreutter v.
McFadden Oil Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 460, 467, 522 N.E.2d 40, 43, 527 N.Y.S.2d 195, 198 (1988) and
McGowan v. Smith, 52 N.Y.2d 268, 272, 419 N.E.2d 321, 323, 437 N.Y.S.2d 643, 645 (1981)).
111 Licci, 20 N.Y.3d at 339, 984 N.E.2d at 900, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 702.
The court cites
McGowan and Kreutter in support of its ―relatively permissive‖ standard, but neither citation
contains explicit language supporting that proposition. See id. The McGowan court,
speaking through Judge Dominick Gabrielli, cited, but did not discuss, Longines-Wittnauer
Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
McGowan, 52 N.Y.2d at 272, 419 N.E.2d at 323, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 645. The court said:
―Essential to the maintenance of a suit against a nondomiciliary under CPLR [section] 302
(subd [a], par 1) is the existence of some articulable nexus between the business transacted
and the cause of action sued upon.‖ Id. In Longines-Wittnauer, a New York plaintiff claimed
he was injured in Connecticut while using a defective hammer manufactured in Illinois by a
non-domiciliary corporation whose New York sales representative had sold the hammer to the
retailer from whom the plaintiff bought it. Longines-Wittnaur, 15 N.Y.2d at 464–65, 209
N.E.2d at 80, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 24–25. The court found long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR
section 302(a)(1). Id. at 467, 209 N.E.2d at 81–82, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 26–27 (―[T]he cause of
106
107
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CPLR section 302(a)(1) limits the broader ―transaction of business‖
prong by restricting jurisdiction to claims arguably connected in a
meaningful way to the business transacted in New York.112 If the
claim is ―‗too attenuated‘ from the transaction, or ‗merely
coincidental‘ with it‖ the statutory mandate of the second prong of
CPLR section 302(a)(1) is not satisfied.113
Then, in a new twist and without citing specific supporting
authority, the court declared:
CPLR [section] 302(a)(1) does not require that every element
of the cause of action pleaded must be related to the New
York contacts; rather, where at least one element arises from
the New York contacts, the relationship between the
business transaction and the claim asserted supports specific
jurisdiction under the statute.114
This broad statement follows the Licci court‘s view that the
plaintiffs‘ allegations included reference to LCB‘s engagement in
terrorist financing by using its correspondent account in New York
to move dollars necessary to enable Hezbollah to inflict physical
damages upon them.115
The court believed these references
arguably violated duties owed to plaintiffs under the various
statutes upon which the subject matter jurisdiction of plaintiffs‘
complaints were based.116 While the court‘s reformulation and
extension of the ―arising out of‖ requirement is arguably fact
specific to Licci, nonetheless it bodes well for the plaintiff‘s bar.117

action asserted is clearly one ‗arising from‘ the purposeful activities engaged in by the
appellant in this State in connection with the sale of its products in the New York market.‖);
see also Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 339 F.2d 317, 321–22 (2d Cir. 1964) (refusing to
find an articulable nexus between a ―transaction of business‖ in New York under CPLR
section 302(a)(1) and the subsequent injury to plaintiffs in Nevada). Based on precedent the
only New York case which applies a permissive ―arising from‖ standard is the LonginesWittnaur court.
112 Licci, 20 N.Y.3d at 339–40, 984 N.E.2d at 900–01, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 702–03.
113 Id. at 340, 984 N.E.2d at 901, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 702 (citing Johnson v. Ward, 4 N.Y.3d
516, 520, 829 N.E.2d 1201, 1203, 797 N.Y.S.2d 33, 35 (2005)).
114 Id. at 341, 984 N.E.2d at 901, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 703. This language is not found in any of
the Court of Appeals‘s prior ―arising out of‖ jurisprudence. It is an obvious extension of the
requirement and is probably fact specific to the repeated use of the New York banking
account by LCB.
115 Id. at 340–41, 984 N.E.2d at 901, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
116 Id. at 340, 984 N.E.2d at 901, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
117 See Siegel, supra note 10.
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IV. COURT OF APPEALS CLARIFIES THE ENTANGLEMENT ISSUE IN
CPLR SECTION 302(A)(1)
In answering the certified questions, the Court of Appeals in Licci
was cognizant of prior New York long-arm jurisprudence, some of
which had entangled statutory and constitutional jurisdictional
findings under CPLR section 302(a)(1).118
The Licci court‘s
thoughtful clarification of the entanglement issue requires a brief
review of New York long-arm jurisprudence.
A. Background
The Court of Appeals has traditionally used a two part inquiry to
determine if a non-domiciliary is subject to in personam jurisdiction
under CPLR 302.119 The first step is to decide if the statutory
requirements of the restricted long-arm statute have been
satisfied.120 Do the defendant‘s contacts with the State fit within
the acts enumerated in the statute‘s language? If so, the next step
is to decide if the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due
process.121
CPLR 302 is a restricted long-arm statute! It does not extend as
far as the constitutional limits permitted by International Shoe and
its progeny.122 As the Second Circuit observed in its Licci opinion,
New York State‘s statutory standards and the Fourteenth
Amendment due process constitutional standards are not co118 See infra notes 129–39 and accompanying text for discussion of the entanglement of
statutory and constitutional considerations pertaining to in personam jurisdictional inquiries.
119 LaMarca v. Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 95 N.Y.2d 210, 214, 735 N.E.2d 883, 886, 713 N.Y.S.2d
304, 307 (2000) (―To determine whether a non-domiciliary may be sued in New York, we first
determine whether our long-arm statute (CPLR 302) confers jurisdiction over it in light of its
contacts with this State. If the defendant‘s relationship with New York falls within the terms
of CPLR 302, we determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process.‖).
The LaMarca analysis is in the context of CPLR section 302(a)(3), but the two-step drill is
presented more clearly than in any other Court of Appeals case. Id. When courts conflate the
statutory and constitutional inquiries, the two-step drill is far less obvious and sometimes not
at all used in the jurisdictional analysis. See, e.g., Chloé v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC,
616 F.3d 158, 163–64 (2d Cir. 2010); Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 609 F.3d 30,
35 (2d Cir. 2010).
120 LaMarca, 95 N.Y.2d at 214, 735 N.E.2d at 886, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 307; SIEGEL, NEW YORK
PRACTICE, supra note 12, § 84, at 148–49; WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 1, ¶
302.00.
121 LaMarca, 95 N.Y.2d at 214, 735 N.E.2d at 886, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 307; SIEGEL, NEW YORK
PRACTICE, supra note 12, § 58, at 85; WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 1, ¶ 302.01.
122
Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 60–61 (2d Cir. 2012),
certified questions accepted, 18 N.Y.3d 952, 967 N.E.2d 697, 944 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2012), and
certified questions answered, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 984 N.E.2d 893, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695 (2012), and
vacated and remanded, No. 10-1306-cv, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 21189 (Oct. 18, 2013).
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extensive, as they are in many states whose long-arm laws provide
that jurisdiction is permitted to the full extent authorized by the
U.S. Constitution.123
Thus, New York State jurisprudence
analyzing the statutory and constitutional requirements has become
somewhat entangled.124
In most states, federal courts determining in personam
jurisdictional issues have only to consider whether a nondomicillary defendant has sufficient statutory contacts to satisfy the
federal due process requirements.125 By contrast, since the New
York long-arm statute is not compatible with the federal Due
Process Clause, the courts must engage in two separate inquiries in
order to find whether in personam jurisdiction exists.126 If there is
no statutory jurisdiction under CPLR 302, a constitutional analysis
is not necessary.127 Unfortunately, some courts in the Empire State,
including the Court of Appeals, have inadvertently conflated the
statutory and constitutional inquiries.128
B. Discussion
1. ―Transaction of Business‖ Clause: CPLR Section 302(a)(1)
The purposeful availment language used by some New York State
courts to define a ―transaction of business‖ has been adopted from
United States Supreme Court opinions examining the federal
constitutional limits on state powers to assert jurisdiction over nondomiciliary defendants.129 In decisions such as Longines-Wittnauer
Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke,130 McKee Electric Co. v. RaulandBorg Corp.,131 George Reiner & Co. v. Schwartz,132 and Deutsche
123 Id.; see also Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 119, 122 & n.17 (collecting examples of long-arm statutes from other states that
extend to constitutional limits).
124 See Licci, 673 F.3d at 61 n.11.
125 See Borchers, supra note 123, at 122 & n.17.
126 Licci, 673 F.3d at 61.
127 Id.
128 See id. at 61 n.11.
129 E.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (―[I]t is essential in each case that
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.‖ (citing Int‘l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945))).
130 Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 457–58, 209
N.E.2d 68, 75–76, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 19 (1965) (describing the activities engaged in by appellant
as ―assuredly adequate to meet the liberal statutory criterion‖ as well as ―any constitutional
objection‖).
131 McKee Elec. Co. v. Rauland-Borg Corp. 20 N.Y.2d 377, 381–82, 229 N.E.2d 604, 607,
283 N.Y.S.2d 34, 37 (1967) (―There is no fixed standard by which to measure the minimal
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Bank Securities, Inc. v. Montana Board of Investors,133 the Court of
Appeals has relied on and cited federal jurisprudence involving
Fourteenth Amendment considerations to decide if a nondomiciliary defendant‘s contacts fit within the statutory limits of
CPLR 302. These decisions ―tend to conflate the long-arm statutory
and constitutional analysis by focusing on the constitutional
standard[s]‖ which results in a significant overlap of definitions for
what constitutes a ―transaction of business‖ under CPLR section
302(a)(1) with the constitutional ―minimum contacts‖ doctrine.134
For example, in Deutsche Bank, the Court of Appeals discusses
the statutory requirements of CPLR section 302(a)(1) and due
process requirements simultaneously.135 While one may applaud
the result in Deutsche Bank, the court‘s two part statutory and
jurisdictional analysis is flawed. Obviously there is some distance
between the jurisdiction permitted by the Due Process Clause and
that permitted under CPLR 302.136 This is particularly true with
CPLR section 302(a)(1).137
Unfortunately, many pre-Licci New York State and federal courts
have relied too heavily on Fourteenth Amendment due process
considerations, instead of state statutory authorities, when
analyzing whether a non-domiciliary has transacted business in
contacts required to sustain jurisdiction under the provisions of CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par.
1).‖).
132 George Reiner & Co. v. Schwartz, 41 N.Y.2d 648, 653, 363 N.E. 551, 554, 394 N.Y.S.2d
844, 847 (1977) (―Here, [defendant] was physically present in New York at the time the
contract, establishing a continuing relationship between the parties, was negotiated and
made and, the contract, made in New York, was the transaction out of which the cause of
action arose. . . . [T]he defendant‘s coming into New York purposefully seeking employment,
his interview and his entering into an agreement with a New York employer which
contemplated and resulted in a continuing relationship between them, certainly are of the
nature and quality to be deemed sufficient to render him liable to suit here.‖).
133 Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v. Mont. Bd. of Invs., 7 N.Y.3d 65, 71–72, 850 N.E.2d 1140,
1142–43, 818 N.Y.S.2d 164, 166–67 (2006) (applying both New York statutory and federal due
process analysis to bond transactions negotiated via electronic means).
134 Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 247 (2d Cir. 2007).
135 Deutsche Bank, 7 N.Y.3d at 71–72, 850 N.E.2d at 1142–43, 818 N.Y.S.2d at 166–67 (―In
short, when the requirements of due process are met . . . a sophisticated institutional trader
knowingly entering our state . . . to negotiate and conclude a substantial transaction is within
the embrace of the New York long-arm statute.‖); see also Carlisle, supra note 11, at 422–23
(describing application of the Deutsche Bank purposeful availment criteria in Fischbarg, in
which the court determined that lack of physical presence was irrelevant in view of the
quality and nature of the defendants‘ electronic contacts with the state).
136 Best Van Lines, Inc., 490 F.3d at 248 (―Some distance remains between the jurisdiction
permitted by the Due Process Clause and that granted by New York‘s long-arm statute.‖).
137 See Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 61 n.11 (2d Cir.
2012), certified questions accepted, 18 N.Y.3d 952, 967 N.E.2d 697, 944 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2012),
certified questions answered, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 984 N.E.2d 893, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695 (2012), and
vacated and remanded, No. 10-1306-cv, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 21189 (Oct. 18, 2013).
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New York under CPLR section 302(a)(1).138 Excessive emphasis on
the federal Due Process Clause has obstructed and distorted the
statutory inquiry of CPLR section 302(a)(1) by New York State and
federal courts. This has produced a body of confusing precedent and
has frustrated the legislative intent of the CPLR‘s drafters.139
Increased emphasis on the proper statutory construction of CPLR
section 302(a)(1) will result in a less restrictive application of New
York‘s long-arm statute and will give our state‘s judiciary discretion
to more permissively apply the statute.
2. The Correct Licci Analysis
The Court of Appeals Licci decision correctly analyzes the
statutory prerequisites of the ―transaction of business‖ clause by
defining ―‗purposeful availment‘ [as] an objective inquiry, . . .
requir[ing] a court to closely examine the defendant‘s contacts for
their quality.‖140 The court‘s analysis does not rely on due process
jurisprudence, but on statutory analysis by New York State
courts.141 The Licci court‘s reformulation of its test for what
constitutes a ―transaction of business‖ provides the bench and bar
with clear guidelines and a focus on a fact-specific, ―quality of
contact‖ standard, which contemplates an increase in jurisdictional
discovery and fact-specific jurisdictional allegations by the party
asserting long-arm jurisdiction.
3. Court of Appeals Extends Jurisdictional Reach of ―Arising Out
of‖ Provision
Assuming the party asserting jurisdiction has shown beyond a
138 See supra notes 125–34 and accompanying text; see also Hi Fashion Wigs, Inc. v. Peter
Hammond Adver., Inc., 32 N.Y.2d 583, 587, 300 N.E.2d 421, 423, 347 N.Y.S.2d 47, 50 (1973)
(―[Defendant] must be deemed to have ‗purposefully‘ availed himself ‗of the privilege of
conducting activities within [this] state,‘ thereby ‗invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.‘‖ (second alteration in original) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958))).
139 See, e.g., Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 16–17, 256 N.E.2d
506, 507–08, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337, 339–40 (1970). In Parke-Bernet, the Court of Appeals
engaged in a very detailed analysis of the facts of the case and how they supported a finding
of valid long-arm jurisdiction. See id. at 15–19, 256 N.E.2d at 507–09, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 338–
41. Forty years later, in Fischbarg, the court presented a similar analysis with the purpose of
applying the long-arm statute to the full extent authorized by the drafters of CPLR section
302(a)(1). Fischbarg v. Doucet, 9 N.Y.3d 375, 380–85, 880 N.E.2d 22, 27–30, 849 N.Y.S.2d
501, 506–09 (2007).
140 Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 338, 984 N.E.2d 893, 899–
900, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695, 701–02 (2012) (citing Fischbarg, 9 N.Y.3d at 380, 880 N.E.2d at 26,
849 N.Y.S.2d at 505).
141 See Licci, 20 N.Y.3d at 338–40, 984 N.E.2d at 899–901, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 701–03.
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preponderance of the evidence that the non-domiciliary transacted
business in New York, she has the same burden of showing her
claim arose out of the transaction.142 This involves consideration of
the ―articulable nexus‖ or ―substantial relationship‖ tests.143 The
tests were created by the Court of Appeals to limit the broader
reach of the ―transaction of business‖ clause.144 Accordingly, the
claim must ―in some way arguably [be] connected to the
transaction,‖ and ―[w]here this necessary relatedness is lacking, . . .
the claim [is] ‗too attenuated‘ from the transaction.‖145 Some New
York State and federal courts have entangled constitutional due
process limits with their ―arising out of‖ statutory interpretation
analysis.146
These courts have viewed the ―arising out of‖
requirement in restrictive terms using elements of proximate cause
for findings of an articulable nexus or substantial relationship
between the claim and business transaction. The Licci Court of
Appeals rejects this approach.147
The Licci court stated, ―We have consistently held that causation
is not required, and that the inquiry under the statute is relatively
permissive.‖148 Nonetheless, the court explained its ―relatively
permissive‖ standard in terms of a relatedness between the
transaction and the legal claim.149 The court stated, ―But these
standards connote, at a minimum, a relatedness between the
transaction and the legal claim such that the latter is not
completely unmoored from the former, regardless of the ultimate
merits of the claim.‖150
The Licci court‘s ―no causation‖ finding means the ―arising out of‖
requirement need only relate to plaintiffs‘ allegations of LCB‘s
transfer of money from its corresponding account in New York with
the knowledge it would be used to fund violent acts by Hezbollah
against the plaintiffs instead of finding an articulable nexus
between the money transfer and the injuries sustained by the
plaintiffs.151 The court‘s distinction is crucial for a finding of

Id. at 339–40, 984 N.E.2d at 900–01, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 702–03.
Id. at 339, 984 N.E.2d at 900, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 702.
144 See id. at 339–40, 984 N.E.2d at 900–01, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 702–03.
145 Id. at 340, 984 N.E.2d at 901, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 703 (quoting Johnson v. Ward, 4 N.Y.3d
516, 520, 829 N.E.2d 1201, 1203, 797 N.Y.S.2d 33, 35 (2005)).
146 See supra notes 128–134 and accompanying text.
147 See Licci, 20 N.Y.3d at 339, 984 N.E.2d at 900, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 702.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. (footnote omitted).
151 Id. at 341, 984 N.E.2d at 901, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
142
143
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jurisdiction over LCB. The Licci court went further by holding that
because personal jurisdiction under CPLR section 302(a)(1) is
―fundamentally about a court‘s control over the person of the
defendant, the inquiry logically focuses on the defendant‘s
conduct.‖152 This suggests that a fact specific pleading connecting a
claim or claims for injuries to allegations that a defendant‘s conduct
violated a duty to plaintiffs, will satisfy the ―arising out of‖
requirement.
The Licci court further liberalized the ―arising out of‖
requirement by stating,
Not all elements of the causes of action pleaded are related
to LCB‘s use of the correspondent account. And the specific
harms suffered by plaintiffs flowed not from LCB‘s alleged
support of a terrorist organization, but rather from rockets.
Yet CPLR [section] 302(a)(1) does not require that every
element of the cause of action pleaded must be related to the
New York contacts; rather, where at least one element arises
from the New York contacts, the relationship between the
business transaction and the claim asserted supports specific
jurisdiction under the statute.153
Thus, even though not all of the Licci plaintiffs‘ claims related to
LCB‘s use of the correspondent account in New York and some
specific harm suffered by plaintiffs resulted from rockets rather
than repeated bank transfers from New York, the plaintiffs‘ pled
enough to satisfy the ―arising out of‖ requirement. The court‘s
language can be characterized as an expansive reading of the
second prong of the CPLR section 302(a)(1) statutory inquiry. It is
particularly helpful to plaintiffs in tort cases, involving claims
arising from a ―transaction of business‖ within New York, but
involving injuries occurring outside the state‘s territorial
boundaries. If these claims, even in some respects, bear a close
connection to the transaction, the ―arising out of‖ prong will be
satisfied if the plaintiff alleges the defendant‘s negligent conduct
has an articulable nexus to the transaction even though the injuries
may not.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals in Licci more precisely defines CPLR section

152
153

Id. at 340, 984 N.E.2d at 901, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
Id. at 341, 984 N.E.2d at 901, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 703.

89 CARLISLE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013/2014]

1/21/2014 8:20 PM

The Licci Case

111

302(a)(1)‘s ―transaction of business‖ clause in objective, fact-specific
terms, focusing on the quality and nature of a non-domiciliaries‘
purposeful conduct in New York. The court draws a clear line
between the statutory conduct and constitutional due process
inquires for a jurisdictional analysis which portends a more
expansive application of the first statutory prong of CPLR section
302(a)(1).
The Licci court also reformulates and liberalizes the second
―arising out of‖ statutory prong of CPLR section 302(a)(1). The Licci
opinion defines the ―arising out of‖ requirement as ―fundamentally
about a court‘s control over the person of the defendant.‖154 The
court specifically states the requirement is ―relatively permissive‖
and is not causally related to the results of a claim.155 Also, the
Licci court makes it clear the ―arising out of‖ requirement does not
demand that all elements of a claim arise out of the business
transaction but that ―at least one element‖ does.156 This suggests
the court‘s willingness to accept statutory inquiries under CPLR
section 302(a)(1) that are more permissive. The Licci court has
signaled that the distance between statutory and constitutional
jurisdictional inquiries has lessened and has clarified its prior
jurisprudential entanglement of the statutory and constitutional
analysis of CPLR section 302(a)(1). It is likely that the state‘s longarm statute will be more expansively applied. It is also likely there
will be an increased use of jurisdictional discovery and more
emphasis on detailed jurisdictional pleading in New York State and
federal courts.
Lastly, the Licci New York State Court of Appeals decided only
that in personam jurisdiction exists over LCB under CPLR section
302(a)(1).157 The Second Circuit still needed to conduct a due
process inquiry under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution before it could make a final determination that LCB
was subject to in personam jurisdiction in the federal action. On
October 18, 2013, the Second Circuit ruled that ―the district court‘s
exercise of personal jurisdiction over LCB is consistent with due
process protections.‖158 With the district court‘s jurisdictional
Id. at 340, 984 N.E.2d at 901, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
Id. at 339, 984 N.E.2d at 900, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 702.
156 Id. at 341, 984 N.E.2d at 901, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
157 See Licci, 20 N.Y.3d at 334, 339, 984 N.E.2d at 897, 900, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 699, 702.
158 Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, No. 10-1306-cv, 2013 U.S. App.
LEXIS 21189, at *31 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2013). The court held that subjecting LCB to specific
jurisdiction was proper because LCB‘s ―selection and repeated use of New York‘s banking
system, as an instrument for accomplishing the alleged wrongs for which the plaintiffs seek
154
155
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dismissal vacated and the matter remanded for further
proceedings,159 the issue remains whether the plaintiffs will succeed
on the merits. The answer to that question, however, will have to
wait until another day.

redress, constitutes ‗purposeful[] avail[ment] . . . of the privilege of doing business in [New
York].‘‖ Id. at *21 (quoting Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 305
F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 2002)) (alterations in original). Furthermore, the court stated that
LCB failed to demonstrate that subjecting it to specific jurisdiction would be unreasonable
and thereby offend ―principles of fair play and substantial justice.‖ Licci, 2013 U.S. App.
LEXIS 21189, at *31. See also Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, Jurisdiction Over
Foreign Financial Institutions Based on Bank Accounts, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 29, 2013, at 3, col. 1
(―As a result of this decision, foreign financial institutions may be subject to personal
jurisdiction in New York based on correspondent accounts they hold in the state, even when
their business is otherwise outside of the United States.‖).
159 Licci, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 21189, at *33.

